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THE  TERM STRUCTURE of interest rates has been extensively studied by 
economists. It is of interest  to financial  economists because of its close 
connection with the pricing of bonds of different maturities. More 
important, understanding  the term structure  of interest rates is also 
critical to the evaluation of the effects of alternative  macroeconomic 
policies. For example, it is widely believed that the monetary  authority 
can most directly control short-term  interest rates, but that aggregate 
demand  depends  primarily  on long-term  interest  rates.  ' If this  conviction 
is correct, the monetary  transmission  mechanism  relies on the behavior 
of the term structure  of interest  rates. 
During  the first few months of 1984 the yield curve has been very 
steep by historical  standards.  The yield on twenty-year  bonds has been 
about 300 basis points above the yield on three-month  Treasury  bills. 
Only rarely have such large spreads been observed in the past.2 The 
yield curve is  widely interpreted as reflecting market participants' 
conviction  that interest  rates will rise over the next several years under 
1. For example, in the simple  IS-LM  model  of Richard  H. Clarida  and Benjamin  M. 
Friedman,  the short rate enters the LM curve but the long rate enters the IS curve. 
Clarida  and Friedman,  "Why Have Short-Term  Interest  Rates Been So High?"  BPEA, 
2:1983,  pp. 553-78. 
2. The average  spread  between twenty-year  bond yields and three-month  bill yields 
over the past two decades is 96 basis points;  the standard  deviation  is 136  basis points. 
The average  since October 1979  is 110;  the standard  deviation  is 206. 
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the pressure  of large  federal  deficits. It is sometimes  even suggested  that 
because of such expectational effects, prospective federal deficits are 
exerting  a dampening  effect on the current  level of economic activity. 
These arguments  presume  that  long rates  reflect  market  expectations  of 
future  short  rates. In this paper,  we examine  this view of the yield  curve. 
Most work on the term structure  is based on some variant  of the 
expectations  hypothesis. This hypothesis  holds  that  the long-term  inter- 
est rate is a weighted  average  of present  and  expected future  short-term 
interest  rates. An approximately  equivalent  form  of the hypothesis  holds 
that the expected one-period  holding  returns  on bonds of all maturities 
are the same or differ  by constant  risk  premiums.3  Unfortunately,  many 
investigators using various techniques and data sets reject the joint 
hypothesis of rational  expectations and the expectations theory of the 
term  structure.4 
This failure of interest rates to move as the theory predicts is not a 
new phenomenon.  In 1938  Frederick  R. Macaulay  wrote, "To preserve 
the theoretical  relationship  between present long term  and future  short 
term  interest  rates, the 'yields' of bonds  of the highest  grades  shouldfall 
during  a period in which short term rates are higher  than the yields of 
the bonds and rise during  a period  in which short  term  rates are lower. 
Now experience is more nearly  the opposite.'"5  As we show below, the 
test of the expectations  theory  derived  under  the assumption  of rational 
expectations is exactly the test Macaulay  suggested almost fifty years 
ago. Moreover, the behavior  of long rates in the recent period that we 
3. The approximate  nature  of the equivalence  is discussed  extensively by John  Cox, 
John  Ingersoll,  and Stephen  Ross, "A Re-examination  of Traditional  Hypotheses  about 
the Term Structure  of Interest Rates," Journal  of Finance, vol. 36 (September  1981), 
pp. 769-99. As demonstrated  by Robert J. Shiller, John Y. Campbell,  and Kermit  L. 
Schoenholtz, "Forward  Rates and Future Policy: Interpreting  the Term Structure  of 
Interest  Rates," BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 173-217,  the equivalence  is exact after  linearization. 
4. There are many recent examples. David S. Jones and V. Vance Roley, in their 
"Rational Expectations and the Expectations Model of the Term Structure:  A Test 
Using Weekly Data," Journal  of Monetary  Economics, vol. 12 (September  1983),  pp. 
453-65, perform  regression  tests on the holding  returns  on T-bills  of different  maturities. 
Robert J. Shiller, in "The Volatility of Long-Term  Interest Rates and Expectations 
Models  of the Term  Structure,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 87 (December  1979), 
pp. 1190-1219,  uses six different  data sets to perform  volatility  tests on American  and 
British  interest rates. Shiller, Campbell,  and Schoenholtz, in their "Forward  Rates," 
find  that long-term  interest  rates have almost  no predictive  power  for future  short-term 
interest  rates. 
5.  Macaulay,  Some  Theoretical Problems  Suggested  by the Movements  of Interest 
Rates,  Bond  Yields, and Stock Prices  in the United States  Since  1856 (National  Bureau 
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examine  is also "nearly  the opposite" from  that  implied  by the theory. 
While  statistical  rejections  of the expectations  theory  are ubiquitous, 
previous  research  has not made  clear  the substantive  significance  of the 
failure  of the theory. One  problem  with  interpreting  previous  test results 
is the absence of an economically  meaningful  alternative  hypothesis. In 
this paper, we embed the expectations theory of the term structure 
within  two wider  classes of hypotheses. This  permits  us tojudge  whether 
the  empirical  deviation  from  the expectations  hypothesis  is substantively 
important. 
The first  class of hypotheses includes  a quantitative  expression  of the 
notion  that the long rate responds "too much" to the contemporaneous 
short rate. This excess-sensitivity hypothesis is suggested  by work on 
the volatility  of long-term  interest  rates. Since the long rate  is, under  the 
expectations hypothesis, a weighted average of expected future short 
rates, the long rate should vary less than the short rate. Robert  Shiller 
examines this smoothing  property  of the expectations hypothesis and 
finds that long rates are too volatile to be consistent with the theory.6 
The excess-sensitivity hypothesis we examine here is one possible 
explanation  for this excess volatility. 
The excess-sensitivity hypothesis is also suggested  by evidence that 
the response of interest  rates  to money supply  announcements  is similar 
at all maturities,  even though  standard  theories  suggest  that  the  response 
of long rates should be much more attenuated. Moreover, this view 
appears  to be widely held among  participants  in the bond  market,  where 
it is conventional wisdom that "long rates follow short rates." This 
hypothesis is also implicit in the popular  claim that financial  markets 
"overreact"  to news or are in some sense "myopic." 
Whether long rates are excessively  sensitive to  short rates has 
important  implications  for macroeconomic  policy. Excess sensitivity, 
for  example,  would  increase  the  potency  of monetary  policy. A reduction 
in short rates would have a greater  impact  on long rates than  under  the 
expectations hypothesis. Such an expansionary  action by the Federal 
Reserve would therefore  have a greater  impact  on aggregate  demand. 
To our surprise, the results of our tests decisively reject the notion 
that long rates are overly sensitive to current  short rates. The results, 
taken literally, imply that current interest rates have a much lower 
(sometimes  negative)  weight  than  theory  would  suggest  so that  expected 
future  short  rates exert a disproportionate  influence  on long-term  rates. 
6. Shiller, "Volatility." 226  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
This literal  interpretation  of the results, however, does not seem satis- 
factory. Alternatively,  the results may reflect  the failure  of the assump- 
tion that market forecasts of future interest rates represent rational 
expectations. In particular, the estimates may indicate that market 
participants  place too little  weight  on the current  short  rate  in  forecasting 
future rates. These conclusions appear robust, with similar results 
obtained  from  analyses of yields on short-term  and  long-term  bonds and 
three-month  and six-month  Treasury  bills. 
Having found that the excess-sensitivity hypothesis cannot explain 
the term structure, we examine whether the hypothesis of a variable 
liquidity  premium  can illuminate  the failure  of the expectations  theory. 
The results suggest that, at least at the short end of the term structure, 
the expectations theory is not very useful in explaining the spread 
between long-term  and short-term  interest  rates. In particular,  only one 
fourth  of the variation  in the spread  between six-month  and  three-month 
Treasury  bill  yields is attributable  to expected  movements  in short  rates. 
The remainder  is attributable  to movements in what are tautologically 
labeled liquidity  premiums.  Large and highly variable  liquidity  premi- 
ums, especially within  the very short  end of the maturity  spectrum,  are 
not easy to understand. 
Excess Sensitivity 
To consider the hypothesis that long rates overreact  to short rates, 
we examine first the behavior of twenty-year  bonds and three-month 
bills and then the behavior  of six-month  and  three-month  bills. 
LONG  RATES  AND  SHORT  RATES 
Let rt be the one-period yield and Rt be the yield on a consol, an 
infinitely  lived bond  paying  a fixed  coupon  each period.  We consider  the 
following general equation relating long rates to rationally expected 
short  rates: 
(1)  Rt =  0 +  (l-y)  ,  yk Etrt+k, 
k=O 
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conditional  on information  available  at time t. The term 0 is the risk or 
liquidity  premium.  For now, we assume 0 is constant;  later  in the paper, 
we consider  the possibility  that  the risk  premium  changes  through  time. 
The expectations  theory  of the term  structure  imposes restrictions  on 
y which  can be approximated  by y = 1/(1 + R*), whereR* is the average 
interest  rate. For values of y lower than this, greater  weight is given to 
the contemporaneous  short  rate  than  is consistent  with the expectations 
theory. The alternative hypothesis of excess  sensitivity can arise if 
agents  place too little weight on rationally  expected future  short  rates- 
that  is, too small  a y. 
Equation 1 is easily transformed  into a simple regression  test of the 
model. Note that  equation  1  implies 
(2)  yRt,  =  yO  +  (l-y)  ,  yk+?1  Ert+k- 
k = I 
Subtract  equation  2 from  equation  1 to obtain 
(3)  Rt-  yRt+  =  (l-,y)O  +  (1-,y)rt-  Et+,- 
where 
et+  I =  (  -y)  E  yk(Et  +,  rt+k  -  Etrt+  k) 
k =  I 
The term Et+,  reflects new information  about future short rates that 
becomes  available  between  time  t and  time  t + 1. Algebraic  manipulation 
of equation  3 yields 
(4)  R++,  -  Rt =  (  51)+  (  7) (R,  -  rt)  +  E+  I 
Equation  4 provides a simple test of expectations theory as a special 
case of equation 1. 
Ordinary  least squares  produces  consistent  estimates  only if the error 
term in the regression is uncorrelated  with the variables  on the right- 
hand side. The assumption of rational expectations implies that this 
condition  is satisfied in equation 4. The error term  t+ I measures the 
"news" that arrived between time t and time t  +  1. The right-hand 
variable, (Rt -  rt), is  known  at time  t. If expectations  are rationally 
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case, rational expectations  imply that (Rt -  rt)  and E,  I  are uncorrelated, 
and  we can thus estimate  equation  4 using  ordinary  least squares. 
Depending on the value of y, equation 4 can represent either the 
standard  expectations theory of the term structure  or the possibility of 
excess sensitivity of long rates to current  short  rates. Under  the expec- 
tations hypothesis, the coefficient on (Rt  -  rt) is R*,  that is, roughly 
0.02.7  If excess sensitivity  of long  rates  to short  rates  explains  the failure 
of the expectations  hypothesis, the estimated  coefficient  should  exceed 
R*,  implying  an estimate  of y below 1/(1 + R*). 
The logic of equation  4 is fairly  intuitive. Ignoring  the risk premium, 
equation 1 states that the long rate is a weighted  average  of short  rates, 
with more recent short rates given greater weight than more distant 
ones. If Rt  is greater  than  rt,  then the short  rate must  be rising.  The next 
period's long rate, Rt,1,  must be higher than the current period's 
because it gives greater  weight to the higher  future short rates. Thus, 
according to both the expectations theory and the excess-sensitivity 
hypothesis, when the current  long rate exceeds the current  short rate, 
the long rate  will (on average)  rise. 
We can give equation  4 another  intuitive  interpretation.  The holding- 
period  return  on long bonds is approximately 
Rt_  (Rt+ I -  Rt) 
-  R* 
The first term in this expression is the coupon yield, while the second 
term  is the capital  gain or loss attributable  to changes  in the long rate. If 
we regress  this holding  return,  less the short  rate, on available  informa- 
tion, we learn  whether  there  are  exploitable  profit  opportunities.  Reject- 
ing  the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficient  in  equation  4 is  R* is equivalent 
to finding  statistically  significant  profit  opportunities. 
If markets  were myopic, placing  greater  weight  on today's short  rate 
than the expectations theory predicts, then when the short  rate is high 
relative  to the long rate, the long rate would nonetheless be "too" high 
and  the price of a long bond "too" low. Holding  long-term  bonds would 
be a profitable  strategy. This would imply that, when regressing the 
7.  With quarterly  data, the appropriate  R* for the theory is the mean quarterly 
interest  rate, which with our sample  is 0.019. The regressions  in the paper  use interest 
rates as percentage  points at annual  rates; but this choice affects the constant terms 
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excess  holding return on the  spread, we  would obtain a  negative 
coefficient. Finding  a negative coefficient  in this regression  is precisely 
equivalent  to estimating  a coefficient  in equation  4 greater  than  R*. 
Equation  4, and thus equation 1, is a consequence of a variety of 
models of asset returns;  for example, it follows from the now-popular 
"consumption  beta" model of asset returns.  If all the relevant  variables 
in this model are  jointly log-normal  and homoskedastic,  then the model 
implies  that  excess returns  cannot  be forecasted.8  In  other  words,  except 
for a constant term that depends on variances and covariances, there 
are no expected profit  opportunities  in this model. Any empirical  failure 
of this proposition implies either that the consumption-beta  theory is 
wrong or that the relevant variances and covariances change through 
time.9 
Table 1 presents estimates of equation 4 using U.S. quarterly  data 
from 1963:1  to 1983:4,  with  interest  rates  expressed  as percentage  points 
at annual  rates. The variable  R, is the yield  at the first  week of the quarter 
on Treasury  securities of a constant maturity  of twenty years, and r, is 
the yield on three-month  Treasury  bills. 
The coefficient  on the  spread (R,  -  r,) has the wrong sign for the 
expectations theory. Regression 1-1 is the ordinary  least squares esti- 
mate using the entire sample. The null hypothesis that the slope coeffi- 
cient is 0.02 is rejected  at the 5 percent  level using  a one-tailed  test. Since 
the coefficient  is negative, the hypothesis  that  it is larger  than  0.02 is also 
rejected. Thus, we reject both the standard  expectations theory of the 
term structure  and the hypothesis of excess sensitivity of long rates to 
current  short  rates. 
In October  1979  the Federal  Reserve  changed  its operating  procedure 
and  began  relying  more  on the targeting  of monetary  aggregates  and  less 
on the targeting  of interest  rates. One might  suspect that this change in 
the policy rule  altered  the relationship  between  interest  rates  of different 
maturities.  In fact, an examination  of the residuals  from regression 1-1 
8. See Lars Peter  Hansen  and Kenneth  J. Singleton,  "Stochastic  Consumption,  Risk 
Aversion,  and the Temporal  Behavior  of Asset Returns,"  Journal  of Political  Economy, 
vol. 91 (April 1983),  pp. 249-65. This is strictly  true only after linearization;  that is, we 
are approximating  log(1 + r) as r. 
9. For a  discussion of  this point, see  Robert J.  Shiller, "Consumption,  Asset 
Markets,  and Macroeconomic  Fluctuations,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, 
eds.,  Economic  Policy  in a  World of  Change,  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series 
on Public  Policy, vol. 17 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1982),  pp. 203-38. 230  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 1.  Regressions for the Change in Long-Term Rates, Selected Periods, 
1963:1 to 1983:4a 
Regression and estimation  period 
Independent  1-1  1-2  1-3  1J4b 
variable  1963:1-1983:4  1963:1-1979:2  1979.3-1983:4  1963:1-1983:4 
Constant  0.18  0.11  0.29  0.13 
(0.09)  (0.05)  (0.34)  (0.06) 
(R, -  r,)  -  0.086  -  0.041  -0.136  -  0.055 
(0.055)  (0.034)  (0.166)  (0.040) 
Summary  statistic 
Durbin-Watson  2.49  2.31  2.59  2.41 
Standard error 
of estimate  0.64  0.30  1.32  0.40 
Source:  Equation 4, estimated  with data from the Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System. 
a.  The dependent  variable is R,+ I  -  R,. The variable R, is the yield on Treasury securities  of a constant  maturity 
of 20 years,  and r, is  the yield  on three-month  Treasury bills,  both at the first week  of each  quarter. Variables are 
expressed  as annual rates in percentage  points.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b.  The regression weights  the subsamples  1963:1-1979:2  and 1979:3-1983:4 differently (weighted  least squares) to 
allow for much greater residual variance  in the second  subsample. 
indicates substantial  heteroskedasticity  coinciding  with this change in 
monetary  regime.  After  the change  in October  1979,  the  residual  variance 
is much  greater. 
In regressions 1-2 and 1-3 we split the sample to examine whether 
the change in policy rule affected the relation  between long rates and 
short  rates. The estimates  suggest  there  has been no shift  in this relation; 
the coefficient  has the incorrect  sign  in both subsamples.  The hypothesis 
that it is 0.02 is rejected  for the earlier  period. It is not rejected  for the 
latter period, because there are many fewer observations and much 
greater  residual  variance. The residuals  from the split samples appear 
Gaussian.  In particular,  an examination  of the third  and  fourth  moments 
indicates  no skewness nor  unusual  kurtosis  that  might  lead  one to distrust 
the reported standard  errors. The rejection of the theory for the first 
subsample  appears  statistically  sound. Moreover,  the point  estimate  for 
the second subsample  indicates that the theory has worked no better 
since  1979.  10 
10. The change in the Federal Reserve's operating procedures in  1979 roughly 
coincides with the growing  use of futures markets  in Treasury  bills. While one might 
have expected that the availability  of futures  markets  would, by facilitating  "yield curve 
arbitrage,"  improve  the performance  of the expectations  hypothesis,  the point  estimates 
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Regression  1-4  uses the entire  sample  but  weights  the two subsamples 
to correct  for the heteroskedasticity.  The weight  is the reciprocal  of the 
root-mean-squared  residual from equation 1. Again, the coefficient is 
negative,  and  the null  hypothesis  that  it is 0.02 or larger  is rejected  at the 
5 percent level. The data support  neither the expectations hypothesis 
nor  the excess-sensitivity hypothesis. 
These empirical  results cannot be interpreted  within the context of 
equation 1; equation 1 is valid only if -y  is between zero and one. The 
coefficient estimates taken literally, however, imply that y is greater 
than one. Nonetheless, we are left with the conclusion that myopia 
explains neither  the excess volatility  of long-term  interest  rates nor the 
other statistical  evidence against  the expectations  theory. 
While our results imply that an investor could, on average, make 
money by taking  advantage  of the failure  of the expectations  theory, the 
risks involved are very large. For example, with long and short  rates at 
about 13 percent and 10 percent respectively, the profitable  strategy 
suggested  by regression 1-4  is to go short  in three-month  Treasury  bills 
and  to use the proceeds  to buy  twenty-year  bonds.  The  estimates  indicate 
that a $1,000 investment of this sort would yield an expected profit  of 
$12 in three months, less any transactions  costs.'1 Such an investment, 
however, is very risky. At the level of uncertainty  observed since 1979, 
the standard  deviation  of this $12  profit  is $165.  The probability  that  this 
strategy would actually produce a loss exceeds 45 percent. Thus, the 
failure of  the expectations theory does  not imply the presence of 
relatively  riskless profit  opportunities. 
Potential problems with sample selection and data mining always 
make the evaluation of statistical results difficult. For example, one 
might  argue that our results are attributable  to an unusual  sequence of 
inflation surprises over our sample period. A standard  practice is to 
check the validity  of the conclusion  on an independent  data  set. One  can 
view our regressions  as just such a validity  check. As noted, Macaulay 
was aware  that  long rates  do not move as the theory  predicts.  Moreover, 
he made his observation many years before the beginning  of our data 
set. Furthermore,  Shiller reports estimates of a regression equation 
11. The expected profit  is R,  -  (R,+,  -  R,)/R*  -  r,. Dividing  the constant  term in 
regression  1-4 by 400 to correspond  to quarterly  interest rates expressed as decimals, 
the expected quarterly  profit  per dollar  is given by 
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parallel  to equation 4 for six different  data sets covering a variety of 
different  sample  periods  and interest  rates.  12 In five of the six cases, the 
estimated  slope coefficient  is negative,  and  in the sixth  it is close to zero. 
In all cases, his results are consistent with our finding  that the failure  of 
the expectations theory cannot be related to excess sensitivity of the 
long rate. The results in table 1 are not merely an artifact of recent 
experience  but appear  to be an empirical  regularity. 
SHORT  RATES  AND  SHORTER  RATES 
There  are a number  of potential  objections  to testing  the expectations 
hypothesis  using  long-term rates.  The  linear  approximation on 
which the derivation  depends may be an unsatisfactory  approximation 
for such long-term yields. It is also possible that there is significant 
segmentation  between the short-term  and long-term  bonds markets,  as 
investors may have distinct "preferred  habitats." In such a situation, 
expectations could be rational  at the same time that the expectations 
theory of the term structure  would not hold. We can address both of 
these objections by examining  yields only at the short end of the term 
structure. Moreover, the use of short-term  instruments  obviates the 
need to model expectations over a long horizon, making  possible the 
examination  of a broader  range  of issues. This  section  therefore  develops 
tests of term structure  hypotheses similar to those in the preceding 
section but applied  to three-month  and six-month  Treasury  bills. 
Let rt be the one-period  yield and r(6) be the two-period  yield. We 
consider  this class of hypotheses: 
(5)  r 6)=  0  +  Art +  (1-X)Etrt+1. 
For  pure  discount  bonds, the expectations  hypothesis  posits that  A = ?/2. 
In  this  case, the yield  from  holding  a two-period  bond  equals  the expected 
yield from holding two one-period  bonds in sequence plus a constant 
risk premium. Under the alternative  hypothesis that the longer rate, 
r(6),  is excessively sensitive to the short rate, r, the current  short rate 
receives greater  weight  than  under  the expectations  theory. That  is, the 
excess-sensitivity hypothesis  implies  A  > ?/2. 
12. Shiller, "Volatility." The data sets Shiller uses extend back to 1919 for the 
United States and to 1824  for the United Kingdom.  All his data sets end before 1978. 
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We can explicitly derive the excess-sensitivity model for one- and 
two-period bills under the assumption that expectations are partly 
myopic.  Let us suppose  that  the expectations  theory  of the  term  structure 
holds but with expectations  that  are not necessarily  rational.  That  is, 
(6)  r(6) =  0  +  ?/2 rt 
+ ?/2 re 
where  rt  +  I  is the market  expectation  of r,+  1.  Let us also suppose  that  the 
market  expectations adapt  only partially  to the rational  expectation of 
the future  rate: 
(7)  re+  =  wrt +  (1-w)Etrt+1. 
If X  =  0, expectations are purely rational.  If w =  1, expectations are 
purely  myopic. Combining  equations  6 and  7, we obtain 
(8)  r  6) =  0  +  ( 
w 
rt +  (  2w )  Er,+1. 
Equation  8 is identical  to equation  5, where  A  = (1 + w)/2.  If expectations 
are partly myopic (w >  0), then A >  1/2 and the two-period yield is 
excessively sensitive to the one-period  yield. 
We now wish to manipulate  equation  5 to derive a test of the model. 
As before, the properties  of rational  expectations  permit  such  a test. We 
first  write the realized  value r,+  I as the sum of the expected value Etr,+  I 
and news Et+ 1: 
(9)  rt+1 =  Etrt+1 +  Et+j. 
We now combine equations 5 and 9. Simple algebraic  rearrangement 
yields 
0  _ 
(10)  (r +1 -  r 6))  -  -  +  (ri6) -  rt) +  Et+j. 
As discussed above in connection  with equation  4, the error  term  Et+j  is 
uncorrelated  with the variable  on the right-hand  side because (ri6)  -  rt) 
is known at time t. Hence, we can estimate equation 10 using ordinary 
least squares. 
Equation  10  provides  another  simple  test of the standard  expectations 
theory  and  the excess-sensitivity model. Under  the expectations  theory, 
the coefficient on (ri6) -  rt) is one because A =  1/2.  If there is excess 
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?/2.  Thus, as in the previous subsection, a simple  ordinary  least squares 
regression  is capable of measuring  the excess sensitivity of the longer- 
term  rate  to the current  short  rate. 
Equation 10 is also intuitive. Ignoring  the risk premium,  equation  5 
implies that the two-period rate is  a weighted average of the two 
consecutive one-period  rates. Therefore,  when the current  longer rate 
is above the current  short  rate, the current  longer  rate should  be below 
next period's short  rate. A regression  of (r,+  I -  rt ) on (r(6) -  rt) should 
yield a positive coefficient. 
We can write equation 10 in two other equivalent ways. First, by 
adding  (ri6)  -  rt)  to both sides of the equation,  we obtain  a regression  of 
(rt  -  rt)  on (r,6) -  rt).  This new equation  relates the change in short 
rates to the spread.  Second, by subtracting  (r,6) -  r,)  from  both sides of 
equation 10, we obtain  a regression  of [rt -  (2r,6) -  rt+  1)]  on (ri6)  -  rt). 
Under the null hypothesis  that A =  1/2,  the coefficient in this regression 
is zero. This second equivalent  form  has a natural  interpretation.  Since 
(2r(6)  -  r,+  1)  is the one-period  holding  return  on a two-period  instrument, 
the variable on the left-hand side is the difference in holding return 
between short and longer instruments.  Under the expectations  theory, 
this excess  return cannot be forecasted. The failure to find a zero 
coefficient in this regression or (equivalently)  a coefficient of one in 
equation  10  indicates  the existence of expected profit  opportunities. 
If markets  were myopic, then when the short rate is high relative to 
the longer rate, the longer rate would nonetheless be "too" high, and 
the price  of a longer  instrument  would  be "too" low. Longer  instruments 
would thus be profitable when the short rate is relatively high. A 
regression  of excess return  [rt -  (2rt  -  r,+ 1)]  on the spread  (r  (6) -  rt) 
would yield a positive coefficient. Finding  a positive coefficient in this 
regression  is exactly equivalent  to estimating  A  >  /2  in equation  10. 
Table  2 shows estimates  of equation  10  with U.S. quarterly  data  from 
1963:1  to 1983:4.  The yield at the first  week of the quarter  on six-month 
Treasury  bills is rt,6  and  the yield on three-month  bills is r,. 
The coefficient on the spread  has the wrong sign. Regression 2-1 is 
the ordinary least squares estimate for the entire sample. The null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is one is rejected  at the 1 percent level. 
The parameter  estimates, taken literally, imply insufficient  rather  than 
excessive sensitivity  of longer-term  interest  rates to short  yields. 
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Table  2. Regressions  Relating  Six-Month  and Three-Month  Rates, Selected  Periods, 
1963:1  to 1983:4a 
Regression and estimation  period 
Independent  2-1  2-2  2-3  2-4b 
variable  1963:1-1983:4  1963:1-1979:2  1979:3-1983:4  1963:1-1983  :4 
Constant  0.02  -0.04  -0.01  - 0.02 
(0.19)  (0.13)  (0.68)  (0.15) 
(r'61 -  r,)  -0.719  - 0.407  - 0.996  -0.470 
(0.556)  (0.428)  (1.536)  (0.421) 
Summary  statistic 
Durbin-Watson  2.45  1.82  2.61  2.05 
Standard  error 
of estimate  1.39  0.69  2.82  0.80 
Source:  Equation  10, with data from the Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is ri60  I  -  ri6). The  variable  ri6)  is the  yield  on  six-month  Treasury bills and rt is the 
yield on three-month Treasury bills,  both at the first week  of each  quarter. Variables are expressed  as annual rates 
in percentage  points.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b.  Weighted least squares (see  table  1, note b). 
substantial  heteroskedasticity  associated with the change in Federal 
Reserve operating  procedure  in 1979.  Regressions  2-2 and 2-3 split the 
sample, and in both subsamples  the sign of the coefficient  is incorrect. 
Just as for the regressions based on equation  4, the recent subsample 
has too few observations  to reject the expectations  hypothesis. Yet the 
theory is rejected  for the earlier  subsample,  and the point estimates do 
not indicate any structural  change caused by the change in monetary 
policy regime. An examination of the residuals from regression 2-2 
indicates  no skewness nor unusual  kurtosis, suggesting  they are at least 
roughly  Gaussian. Again, the rejection  of the expectations theory and 
the excess-sensitivity hypothesis appears  statistically  sound.  13 
Regression 2-4 again uses the entire sample but weights the two 
subsamples  by the reciprocal of the root-mean-squared  residual  from 
regression  2-1 to correct  for heteroskedasticity.  Again, the null hypoth- 
esis that the coefficient  is one or larger  is rejected  at the 1  percent  level. 
Again, the estimate implies X  < 0, which taken  literally  implies  that the 
current  short rate has a negative weight in forming  longer-term  yields. 
This finding  is clearly implausible,  but it does indicate  that the data are 
13. These results  raise  the question  of whether  the results  in the preceding  subsection 
are due only to the failure  of the expectations hypothesis  at the very short end of the 
term structure.  This possibility was tested by replicating  the previous tests with one- 
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consistent  neither  with the expectations  hypothesis  nor  with the excess- 
sensitivity  hypothesis.  14 
As already noted, the excess-sensitivity model for one- and two- 
period bills is equivalent to a model in which expectations are partly 
myopic. The estimate  in regression  2-4  implies  A  is - 0.89 and  w  is - 2.8. 
Thus, in the myopic  expectations  interpretation  of the model, the market 
expectation gives a negative weight to the current short rate and an 
excessively large  weight to the rational  expectation.  This interpretation 
of the results is again implausible.  It does indicate, however, that the 
failure  of the expectations  theory  cannot  be easily explained  by an  appeal 
to naive expectation  formation. 
Observers  of financial  markets  often comment  that  these markets  are 
myopic. The empirical  results in both subsections decisively reject a 
simple quantitative  expression of this view. The implausibility  of the 
results  suggests that  equations 1  and  8 are not satisfactory  models  of the 
term structure.  Taken  at face value, the results imply  that the market  is 
hyperopic:  the market  gives too little weight to the current  rate and too 
much  weight  to the expected future  rate  or its determinants. 
A parallel  phenomenon  has  been observed  in the stock  market.  Shiller 
finds  that when current  dividends  are high relative  to the current  price, 
the holding return on the stock market is high."5  Using an argument 
similar  to that used with regard to equation 1, this suggests that the 
market  gives too little weight  to contemporaneous  dividends.  Similarly, 
Sanjoy Basu shows with cross-sectional data that when a company's 
current  earnings  are high relative to its price, the company's stock will 
on average  outperform  the market.  16 Again, the market  price  appears  to 
14. David  Wilcox  has  recently  performed  regression  2-4  using  weekly  data,  correcting 
for the implied  moving-average  error. He obtains  a slope coefficient  of - 0.040, with a 
standard  error  of 0.385. He also examines the quarterly  samples  beginning  at different 
weeks in the quarter.  For each subsample,  the slope estimate  is well below one, although 
for some subsamples  a coefficient of one could not be rejected. Wilcox, "Linear  and 
Nonlinear  Tests of the Expectations  Hypothesis  in the Treasury  Bill Market"  (Massa- 
chusetts Institute  of Technology, 19,84). 
15. Robert  J. Shiller,  "Do Stock Prices  Move  Too Much  to be Justified  by Subsequent 
Changes  in Dividends?"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 71 (June 1981),  pp. 421-36. 
16. S.  Basu, "Investment Performance  of Common Stocks in Relation to Their 
Price-Earnings  Ratio:  A Test of the Efficient  Markets  Hypothesis,"  Journal  of Finance, 
vol. 32 (June  1977),  pp. 663-82, and Sanjoy  Basu, "The  Relationship  Between Earnings' 
Yields, Market Value and Return for NYSE Common Stocks: Further Evidence," 
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give too little weight to contemporaneous  earnings.  Thus none of these 
violations of the efficient-markets  hypothesis is consistent with the 
alternative  hypothesis  of myopia. 
AN  ALTERNATIVE  MODEL  OF  OVERREACTION 
As explained above, the excess-sensitivity hypothesis that we have 
examined and rejected is equivalent to a model in which investors 
irrationally  place  too large  a weight  on the  current  short  rate  in  forecasting 
future short rates. Although this formulation  appears to be a natural 
model of "irrational"  expectations, it is not the only possible one. We 
next consider  another  plausible  model of overreaction  in which, instead 
of placing too large a weight on the level  of the current short rate, 
investors place too large a weight on the news contained  in the current 
short  rate. 
Let us again  suppose that  the expectations  theory  holds: 
(ll)  ri6)  =  0  +  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1/2  r, +  V/2  rte+ 
where rte+  Iis  the market  expectation  of r,+  1. Let vt  be the news, arriving 
in period t, concerning  the path  of short  rates;  in particular,  we consider 
the news contained in an innovation  in the current  short rate. Let us 
consider  the possibility  that investors overreact  to this news in forming 
their  expectations, so that  their  expectations  are given by 
(12)  re+  =  Etrt+  1 +  4 v,, 
where Etrt+I  is the rational expectation. If  0  =  0, then the market 
expectation is rational. If +  >  0, then the market overreacts to the 
current  news about short  rates. 
Algebraic  manipulation  of equations 11  and 12  produces  an equation 
similar  to the one we estimate  above: 
(13)  rt 
-  r6)  -20  +  (r(6) 
-  r,) -  4vV  +  Et+l. 
Equation  13  is  like  equation  10  (when  A  =  ?/2, reflecting  rational 
expectations)  with an additional  term:  the innovation  in the short  rate.  17 
17. Note that under  the null hypothesis  the news term  equals the following  period's 
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This alternative  model of overreaction  suggests a different  regression 
test.  18 
To investigate this alternative  model, we must obtain a measure of 
the innovation  in short rates. To do this, we model the short rate as a 
third-order  autoregressive  process, although  other  specifications  appear 
to produce similar results. Estimation of this process for the period 
1963:4  to 1983:4  yields 
(14)  rt =  0.60 +  0.64r,  -  0.02rt-2  +  0.30r,  3 +  Vt, 
(0.37)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.11)  _ 
Durbin-Watson  =  1.86  Standard  error  of estimate =  1.30  R2 = 0.81 
where numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  We use the residuals 
from  this regression  as measures  of the innovation  in the short  rate, vt. 
Estimation of equation 13 with the heteroskedasticity correction 
produces  the following  result: 
(15)  rt+l 
-  r  =  -  0.05  -  0.40 (r,6) -  r,)  +  0.03 vt. 
(0.13)  (0.44)  (0.  1  1) 
Durbin-Watson  = 2.04  Standard  error  of estimate = 0.79 
Thus, contrary  to the implications  of this alternative  model  of overreac- 
tion, the innovation  has a positive and insignificant  coefficient. More- 
over, the coefficient on the spread remains  negative and significantly 
different  from one. 
If we impose the restriction  that the coefficient  on the spread  is one, 
as implied by equation 13, the results are no more supportive  of the 
model. We find 
(16) 
rt+l 
-  r-6)  -  0.36  +  1.0(ri6)  -  r,)  +  0.12v,. 
(0.09)  (0. 1 1) 
Durbin-Watson  =  1.96  Standard  error  of estimate = 0.83 
Again, the coefficient  on the innovation  has the wrong  sign. The data  do 
not appear  consistent  with the view that  investors  place  too much  weight 
on recent news in forecasting  future  short  rates.  19 
18. This test is analogous  to the test of the permanent  income hypothesis  suggested 
by Marjorie  A. Flavin, "The Adjustment  of Consumption  to Changing  Expectations 
about Future  Income," Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 89 (October  1981),  pp. 974- 
1009. 
19. An analogous  test can be derived  for the case of short-term  bills and long-term 
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Variable Liquidity Premiums 
The previous section demonstrates  the failure of the expectations 
theory of the term structure. The alternative  hypothesis, that longer 
rates  respond  too much  to short  rates, cannot  explain  the rejection.  The 
purpose of this section is to show in another way that the failure is 
substantively  significant. 
Consider  the following slight  modification  of the expectations  theory 
for one- and two-period  bills: 
(17)  r(6)=  0,  +  /2  r, +  1/2 E,r,+. 
In  this  formulation,  the long  rate  ri6)  differs  from  an  average  of the current 
and future short rates by the term Ot.  Our test above assumes Ot  is 
constant. In this section we make  the less-restrictive  assumption  that Ot 
is uncorrelated  with short  rates. 
The term  Ot can be interpreted  in two ways. First, we can view Ot as a 
time-varying  liquidity premium  representing  the extra compensation 
required  to induce a lender  to hold the longer-term  instrument.  Edward 
Kane finds, based upon surveys of the expectations of market  partici- 
pants, that  liquidity  premiums  are  positive and  time varying.20  Note that 
once it is extended to include a time-varying  liquidity premium, the 
expectations  theory becomes almost vacuous. The liquidity  premium  is 
a deus ex machina. Without  an explicit theory of why there is such a 
premium  and  why it varies, it has no function  but  tautologically  to rescue 
the theory. Nonetheless, if such fluctuations  are small relative to the 
observed  movement  in longer  rates, the expectations  theory  may still  be 
useful. By contrast, if fluctuations  in the liquidity  premium  account  for 
a large  fraction  of the variance  in the slope of the yield curve, then the 
expectations theory fails to provide a useful guide for understanding 
these fluctuations. Estimating  the extent of variations  in the liquidity 
premium  thus  provides  a way of evaluating  the power  of the expectations 
theory  as a vehicle for understanding  the term  structure  of interest  rates. 
A second interpretation  of the term  Ot  is as a measure  of the extent to 
which the market  fails to produce  the "right"  longer  rate given current 
20. Edward J.  Kane,  "Nested Tests of  Alternative Term-Structure  Theories," 
Review  of Economics and Statistics, vol. 65 (February  1983),  pp. 115-23. 240  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
and  expected future  short  rates. In other  words, Ot  is the deviation  of the 
market  long-term  rate from the long rate based upon fundamentals.2'  If 
the variance  of Ot  is relatively small, we can conclude that the expecta- 
tions  theory  is approximately  correct.22  On  the other  hand,  if fluctuations 
in 0,  dominate  fluctuations  in longer  rates, then  we can conclude  that  the 
expectations  theory  fails. 
Above we derived equation 10 as a simple test of the expectations 
theory. With  the term  0O  added  to the model, a parallel  equation  is 
(18)  (rt+  -  r  )) =  ao0,  +  I3(r  61 -  r,) -etl 
where, according  to the theory, a  =  - 2 and I  =  1. Although  Ot  is not 
observable, we can infer its importance  on the assumption that the 
theory is correct. Since Ot  is correlated  with r  6(, its omission from the 
regressions  in table  2 leads to a biased  estimate  of P. In particular,  ', the 
estimate  of P, is given by 
(19)  =  3 +  a Cov (r,6) -  r,, 0,)/Var(r,6)  -  r,). 
Under  the null  hypothesis  that  the model  is correct  (a =  -2,  a  =  1, and 
Ot  is uncorrelated  with r,), the estimate  of P becomes 
(20)  =  1 -  2 Var(0,)/Var(r(6)  -  r,). 
Thus, as long as Ot  is not constant, the estimate  of 1 is biased  downward 
from 1.0. 
From equation  20 we can use the estimates in table 2 to produce  the 
estimates of Var(0,)/Var(r(6)  -  r,) shown below, with standard  errors  in 
parentheses: 
Regression  and estimation period 
2-1  2-2  2-3  24 
1963:1-1983:4  1963:1-1979:2  1979:3-1983:4  1963:1-1983:4 
0.86  0.70  1.00  0.74 
(0.28)  (0.21)  (0.77)  (0.21) 
From regression 2-4, which uses the entire sample and corrects for 
heteroskedasticity, we find that Var(0,)/Var(r,6)  -  r,) is 0.74 with a 
21. The analysis here is parallel  to that in Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Do We Really 
Know That Financial  Markets  are Efficient?"  Working  Paper  994 (National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research, 1982). 
22. Explaining a  mean value significantly  different from zero would also pose 
problems. N.  Gregory Mankiw and Lawrence  H.  Summers  241 
standard  error  of 0.21  . This  ratio  has  a natural  interpretation.  Maintaining 
our  assumption  that  0,  is uncorrelated  with  short  rates,  equation  8 implies 
(21)  Var(r(6)  -  r,) =  Var(O,)  +  1/4 Var(Etr,+I -  rt). 
The variance of the spread between longer and short rates is thus 
decomposed into the variance in expected changes in short rates and 
Var(O,).  This decomposition  implies that expected changes in the short 
rate account for only 26 percent of the variance  in the spread  between 
the six-month and three-month  Treasury  bills. We can reject the null 
hypothesis that Var(O,)  =  0, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that  expected changes in the short  rate  account  for none of the variance 
in the spread  between three-month  and six-month  bills. 
It is  important to  note that, although this unexplained liquidity 
premium  Ot  appears  central  to the spread  between six-month  and three- 
month  rates, it is relatively  unimportant  to the level of six-month  rates. 
We can decompose the variance  in the six-month  rate  as follows: 
(22)  Var(ri6)) =  Var(O,) +  Var(rt) + ?/4Var(E,rt+-  rt) 
+ Cov(rt,  Etr,+I  - rt). 
Simple  calculation  demonstrates  that  Var(r,6))  is much  larger  than  Var(O,). 
In particular,  Var(r,)/Var(r(6))  is 1.05, while Var(O,)/Var(r  6)) is only 0.01. 
Thus, although  Ot  is critical  to (r,6) -  r,), its importance  to understanding 
ri6) is much  less.23 
Conclusions 
The data decisively reject, both statistically  and substantively, the 
expectations hypothesis regarding  the term structure  of interest rates. 
The alternative  hypothesis that long rates are overly sensitive to short 
rates  is also decisively  rejected.  The  expectations  theory  can  be modified 
to include  an unexplained  random  liquidity  premium,  but then expected 
interest  rate movements  account  for only a small  part  of the variance  in 
the spread between interest rates of different  maturities.  Most of the 
23. The reason for this is that both short and long rates are highly autocorrelated, 
and  thus the variance  of r,6'  is much  greater  than  the variance  of (r,6)  -  r). For example, 
suppose  that r, followed an AR(1)  process with parameter  0.8 and that the expectations 
hypothesis  held exactly. Then we can show that Var(r,6)  -  r,) would be 1 percent of 
Var(r(6)).  Introducing  a random  liquidity  premium  increases  both variances  equally and 
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changes in the slope of the yield curve reflect these changing  liquidity 
premiums  or expectations that do not satisfy the standard  postulates  of 
rationality. 
These results suggest the importance  of developing  models capable 
of explaining  fluctuating  liquidity premiums.24  Presumably  this would 
involve recognizing  in some way the heterogeneous  liquidity  positions 
of different  economic agents. The results  also raise important  questions 
about the monetary transmission  mechanism. If, as usually thought, 
spending decisions and capital-asset valuations depend primarily  on 
long-term rates, monetary policy may operate by changing liquidity 
premiums  as well as by affecting short rates. Although  many question 
the effectiveness of open market  operations  directed  at shifting  the yield 
curve, such as "Operation  Twist," the issue is difficult to evaluate 
without  a fuller  understanding  of the determinants  of liquidity  premiums. 
The failure  of the expectations  hypothesis  does make  more  plausible  the 
view that  the supplies  of assets of different  maturities  influence  yields.25 
However, it is  difficult to  understand  why these effects would be 
important  in the market  for three-month  and six-month  bills. 
Our negative results provide an additional  reason for uncertainty  in 
predicting  the effects exerted on financial  markets  by alternative  mone- 
tary and fiscal policies; the results suggest  that estimating  the impact  of 
such policies on future short-term  rates is not likely to be a good guide 
to predicting  their impact  on long-term  rates or asset valuations.  These 
effects may depend more on liquidity  premiums  than on expectations. 
Without  a satisfactory  theory  of liquidity  premiums,  predicting  the effect 
of policies on the shape of the yield curve is almost  impossible. 
24. For work along these lines, see Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane, and Robert  McDonald, 
"Why are Real Interest Rates So High?" Working  Paper 1141 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1983). 
25. For a discussion of this type of effect, see Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "Financial 
Flow Variables  and  the Short-Run  Determination  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates," Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 85 (August 1977),  pp. 661-89. Comments 
and Discussion 
Laurence Weiss: Mankiw  and Summers  reexamine  the evidence per- 
taining to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure  to see if 
previous failures of this theory can be "explained" by an alternative 
view that markets  "overreact" to short rates. To the authors' evident 
surprise  they find  this alternative  unenlightening  and  leave the failure  of 
this theory  as an unresolved  puzzle. 
The paper consists of two regression tests of the hypothesis that 
expected holding-period  returns on bonds of different maturities  are 
equal, except for perhaps a time-invariant  risk or liquidity premium. 
Under  this hypothesis, the expected change  in both short  and  long rates 
should  be positively related  to the slope of the current-yield  curve, the 
difference  between current  long and short  yields. Comparison  of yields 
on twenty-year  bonds and three-month  Treasury  bills shows that there 
is an  anomalous  (although  statistically  insignificant)  negative  relationship 
between the slope of the yield curve and expected changes in the long 
rate. At the short  end of the yield curve the theory does slightly  better. 
Comparison  of yields between six- and three-month  T-bills shows that 
when the six-month  rate is above the three-month  rate there is a slight 
(although  again  insignificant)  tendency for the future  rate to rise. How- 
ever, the magnitude  of this effect is statistically  less than  that  predicted 
by the theory. The authors  deem  these results  a "substantive"  failure  of 
the theory. 
The authors  fall short  of concluding  that the term structure  contains 
no information  relevant for predicting  future short rates. Fama has 
recently  investigated  the informational  content of the term structure  at 
the very short end of the maturity spectrum (one to six months).1 
1. Eugene  E. Fama,  "The  Information  in the  Term  Structure"  (University  of Chicago, 
1983). 
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Comparison  of changes  in future  spot rates  with the difference  between 
implicit  forward  rates  and  current  spot  rates  shows  that  the  term  structure 
can  predict  changes  in  the one-month  rate  one month  ahead.  A regression 
of changes  in'the  one-month  rate  on the difference  between the forward 
and  spot rates  produces  a coefficient  of 0.46 (standard  error = 0.07)  over 
the entire sample period 1959-82, with similar results holding over 
various subperiods  as well. However, this coefficient is less than the 
predicted  value of one from the pure expectations hypothesis, and the 
R2  of this regression  is only 0.13. Beyond a one-month  horizon, Fama 
finds  essentially no information  for predicting  changes  in the one-month 
rate, and at every time horizon a naive forecast that the spot rate will 
remain  unchanged  dominates  (in a mean square  error  sense) a forecast 
that  future  spot rates equal  current  forward  rates. 
The finding  that  future  short  rates are more  closely related  to current 
short rates than to implicit  forward  rates is another  way of stating  the 
major  findings  of Mankiw  and Summers.  To oversimplify  a bit, short 
rates are close to a random  walk, which implies,  from  the pure  expecta- 
tions hypothesis, that long rates should  equal short  rates. To the extent 
that long rates fail to move one for one with short rates one might 
conclude  that  long rates "underreact"  to the current  short  rate. 
The rejection of the theory over the sample period covered in this 
paper appears related to an equally puzzling phenomenon of recent 
history-the  dismal performance  of long-term bonds. Ibbotson and 
Sinquefield  report  that  from 1963  to 1981  the (geometric)  average  of the 
holding-period  returns  of long-term  bonds has been  just 2.4 percent, far 
short of those on short bonds (6.2 percent) or common stocks (6.6 
percent).2  By way  of comparison,  from  1925  to 1963,  long  bonds  averaged 
2.6 percent per year while short bonds returned  just  1.4 percent. 
Apparently  this historical  episode has been dominated  by unanticipated 
rises in expected inflation  rates. Periods when the yield curve departs 
from its gentle upward slope (1966, 1969, 1974, 1979-81) have been 
generally  associated  with  unexpected  inflation  and  high  short-term  rates, 
which were apparently  believed to be more  temporary  than subsequent 
events bore out. 
In short, if one has to find  a pattern  of expectational  errors  to salvage 
2.  Roger E. Ibbotson and Rex A. Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: The 
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the expectations hypothesis and explain the dominance  of short over 
long  bonds  during  this period,  then  this explanation  does not seem to me 
to be farfetched. Of course, introducing  expectational errors as free 
parameters  to explain  the data  is not a good practice,  but in the absence 
of a credible  alternative  explanation,  it will have to suffice. 
However, as the authors  point  out, these results  appear  robust  across 
many  different  historical  episodes. I cannot  say whether  my explanation 
of recent U.S. experience  can account  for these other  results. 
I might also add that the authors overstate the importance  of the 
expectations  hypothesis  for understanding  the role of monetary  policy. 
They claim that "it is widely believed that the monetary  authority  can 
most  directly  control  short-term  interest  rates,  but  that  aggregate  demand 
depends primarily  on long-term  interest rates." Although  this view is 
perhaps  consistent with conventional  Keynesian  analysis, I know of no 
empirical  support  for either  proposition.  From  Christopher  Sims's work 
it is clear that short rates are most closely related to business cycle 
phenomena, and my own work with Robert Litterman  suggests that 
monetary  policy cannot affect (or more modestly, has not affected) ex 
ante real short rates. In short, the expectations hypothesis is not the 
weak link in what is "widely believed" to be true about the monetary 
transmission  mechanism. 
General  Discussion 
Albert Wojnilower suggested that it was the Treasury's failure to 
adjust the supplies of debt of different maturities  that permitted  the 
observed anomalies  in the yield structure  that were identified  as errors 
in the expectations theory. The theory presumes that arbitragers  will 
make the theory work. But when the issuer, with virtually  unlimited 
issuing ability, does not adjust  supply in response to relative  yields on 
securities  of different  maturities,  discrepancies  from  the term structure 
predicted by the theory may persist. Benjamin  Friedman  added that 
models he and others had developed and estimated showed that the 
relative supplies of long- and short-term  government  debt help explain 
the yield spread  and that the failure  of the pure expectations  theory of 
the term  structure  left open the possibility  of a role  for debt-management 
policy by the Treasury. Barry Bosworth countered that the profit 
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rejected  the hypothesis  that  capital  markets  were essentially  perfect  and 
arbitrage  successful among securities of different  maturity.  Friedman 
responded that the arbitrage  between securities of widely differing 
maturities  was likely to be quite limited because their risk properties 
were so different. 
Friedman  noted that the failure  of the expectations  theory  to predict 
the relation  between three-month  and six-month  interest  rates  could not 
be readily salvaged by explanations, such as the relative supplies of 
bonds and bills or varying risk differentials,  that might work for the 
relations between bond rates and short rates. This suggested that 
expectations were systematically wrong over long periods of time, a 
result  that  was supported  by survey  data. However, Robert  Hall  consid- 
ered the authors'  evidence on expectations  as inconclusive, drawing  an 
analogy between his own work on consumption  and income and their 
finding  that  the movement  between long and short  rates  is not explained 
primarily  by expectations. He observed  that  if long rates  and short  rates 
move a lot and largely  move together,  just as consumption  and income 
do, the difference  between long and short  rates  is so small  that  it is not a 
dependable  variable in a regression. In the presence of other factors 
affecting  the term  structure,  this makes  it difficult  to infer  the underlying 
relation between short and long rates from regressions such as the 
authors'  and therefore  difficult  to test whether  the expectation  theory  is 
violated. 
Several participants  offered suggestions  for exploring  the deviations 
from  the expectations  theory  that  are otherwise  tautologically  identified 
as a time-varying  risk premium.  Alan Blinder  suggested incorporating 
into the term structure  equation a direct measure of risk, such as the 
spread  between interest  rates on government  and Baa corporate  securi- 
ties or the volatility  of bond  prices  or of short-term  interest  rates. Robert 
Gordon  urged a broad view of what developments  might  impact  long- 
and short-term  rates differentially  and thereby  affect the risk premium. 
The term  structure  could be affected  not  just by unexpected  inflation,  as 
Weiss had suggested, but by surprises in output or other economic 
developments or by institutional changes in the country's financial 
structure. Edmund Phelps suggested putting in a range of economic 
variables  to see if there was anything  systematic  about  the irrationality 
implied  by the paper's  results.  He reasoned  that  certain  kinds  of surprises 
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effects on longer-term  rates. Charles Schultze believed the authors' 
findings  might  reflect a general  tendency of people to overcorrect  their 
previous views about the future on the basis of the latest information 
they receive.  Even if the yield curve eventually tends toward the 
prediction  of the expectations  theory,  the initial  overreaction  of the yield 
curve to news could generate the results observed by Mankiw and 
Summers. 